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Modernity begins almost 3500 years ago with the prohibition 
to worship the wrong gods or God in the wrong way. The icono- 
clastic impulse against false representations is the hallmark of 
enlightenment, rationality, and modernization. The Egyptian 
pharaoh Akhenaten seems to have been the first in history to 
get this idea through with considerable force, in the middle of 
the fourteenth century B.C., by abolishing the entire Egyptian 
pantheon, closing the temples and feasts, and firing the priests. 
In Egypt, this move towards modernity stayed an episode of at 
most twenty years but in Israel, with Moses, it gained ground 
with consequences that eventually changed the world more 
radically than any political or technological revolution. Until then, 
mankind lived in fear of neglecting any important deity; now, the 
much greater fear seized them to worship false gods and to fall 
into idolatry or heresy. The revolutionary idea of religious false- 
hood, of false gods and wrong religion, finds its clearest and most 
radical expression in the second commandment: thou shalt not 
make for thyself any graven image. The “graven image” is the 
paramount and symbol of wrong religion.
The prohibition of images and its underlying distinction between 
truth and falsehood means the beginning of the era of western 
modernity in which we are still living. But what could have been 
its original meaning? Why forbid images? What’s wrong with 
them, in the eyes of God? And what do we learn about the 
concept of “image” from the fact that God forbids the making 
and the worshiping of them? Let us first recall the text of the 
commandment:
You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any 
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, orthat is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You 
shall not bow down to them or serve them, for I the LORD 
your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers 
on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those
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who hate me, but showing steadfast love to thousands of 
those who love me and keep my commandments.
The prohibition of images is the only commandment that receives 
an explanation. Thou shalt not make thyself images because God 
is jealous and he distinguishes between his foes, the image- 
worshipers, and his friends who abstain from worshiping images. 
Images rouse the jealousy of God because they attract worship 
and thus distract men from exclusively worshiping God who does 
not tolerate any other gods beside him. God considers images to 
be other gods and thus rivals.
The text does not refer to specific images, i.e. cult-images of 
other gods, but to images of whatsoever. Every image that 
represents something counts as another god that rouses God’s 
jealousy. We must not forget that we are here in a world, to quote 
Hans Belting, “before the age of art.” Images are not made for 
aesthetic pleasure, for decoration and embellishment, butfor 
worship. Worship is the only raison d'etre for the production of 
images. Moreover, we are in an enchanted world, a world full of 
gods. In this world of divine immanence, every image has the 
power to turn into a god. Images are prohibited because they are 
all too powerful: they enchant or divinize the world. To prohibit the 
production of images, therefore, means to prohibit the adoration 
ofthe visibte world. The visible world in its shapes and forms 
must not be adored and in orderto avoid this mistake, it must not 
be represented in images. The composer Arnold Schonberg, 
when working on hisopera Moses and Aaron, has given a very 
convincing interpretation of this aspect of the second command- 
ment. Images, he writes, are false gods. I quote first in German 
and then try an English translation:
Ein falscher Gott ist in allem enthalten, das uns umgibt, er 
kann so aussehen wie alles, er entspringt allem, alles 
entspringt ihm; er ist wie die ganze umgebende Natur und 
diese ist in ihm, wie in allem enthalten. Dieser Gott ist der
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Ausdruck einer Naturverehrung und setzt jedes Lebewesen 
Gottgleich.
[There is a false god in everything that surrounds us; he can 
look like everything, he originates in everything, everything 
originates in him; he is like the entire surrounding nature and 
nature is in him as in everything. This god expresses the wor- 
ship of nature and identifies every living creature with God.]
There is, however, yet another explanation of the prohibition of 
images in the Bible that gives it a very different meaning. This 
explanation is to be found in the book of Deuteronomy: “There- 
fore watch yourselves very carefully. Since you saw no form on 
the day that the LORD spoke to you at Horeb out of the midst of 
the fire, beware lest you act corruptly by making a carved image 
foryourselves ...” (Deuteronomy 4:15-16) God is invisible. 
Therefore, he cannot be worshiped in anything visible, be it an 
image or a heavenly body. It is interesting to note that images 
are here given the same status as sun and moon and stars. The 
visible forms, especially the heavenly bodies, are given to the 
other nations as objects of worship. They are the gods of the 
others and must not be worshiped by Israel who has acquired a 
special status where anything visible is banished from commu- 
nication with God.
This explanation does not refer indifferently to images whatso- 
ever but only to images of God. Jahwe, the god of Israel, must not 
be represented in an image because he is invisible. Here, the 
prohibition of images is not so much a matter of loyalty, of not 
worshiping other gods, but of not worshiping God in the wrong 
way. Both meanings amount to a rejection of, or an exodus from, 
the enchanted world. In the first meaning, it is man who is called 
upon to extract himself from the pitfalls of world enchantment 
by abstaining from image-making; in the second meaning, it is 
God himself who is emancipated from any intra-mundane
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representability. Let us keep these two meanings apart by calling 
the first one political, because it is a matter of loyalty and commit- 
ment, and the second one theological, because it is based on a 
theological statement: the invisibility of God.
The first meaning is supported by the context, not only because 
the prohibition of images is a commentary on the prohibition of 
other gods, but also because it is followed by an explanation 
stressing the jealousy of God and his distinction between friend 
and foe:
... for I the LORDyour God am ajealous God, visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth 
generation of those who hate me, but showing steadfast love 
to thousands of those who love me and keep my command- 
ments,
This is an unequivocally political commentary. God resents the 
making of images as an act of defection and apostasy. This shows 
the political meaning of images to be at least originally the domi- 
nant interpretation. The prohibition of images divides the world 
into two parties: the idolaters and the iconoclasts, the first being 
the enemies and the second being the friends of God. The 
second, the theological interpretation, is supported by Deuter- 
onomy's emphasis on the invisibility of God. Images are, thus, 
forbidden for two reasons: a) because every image represents a 
(false) god. This is a question of loyalty. Images are other gods 
and provoke God's jealousy; b) because no image is able to 
represent the invisible God. This is a question of God’s nature. 
Given the invisibility of God, image is the wrong medium to 
establish a contact with the divine.
The concept of medium leads us to a next step. If images are the 
wrong medium, is there an alternative? Is there a right medium of 
establishing a contact with God, or does the prohibition of images 
throw us into an abyss of negative theology?
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This second possibility was, in fact, the position of Schonberg, 
who, in his opera Moses and Aaron, interprets the prohibition of 
images in an extremely radical way. Moses condemns not only 
the Golden Calf, but the whole Bible as an image, “wrong as an 
image can be.” His Moses despairs at the end of the communi- 
cability of any idea of God, not only through images but also 
through words. He collapses with the cry: O Wort, Du Wort, 
das mir fehlt! [O word, you word that I miss.]
This radical position of negative theology, however, by no means 
corresponds to what the Bible intends by the prohibition of 
images. The Bible luxuriates in verbal images of God and these 
are obviously fully admitted. There is nothing wrong with language. 
Schonberg calls God not only invisible but also unimaginable. 
This does not correspond to the biblical view. On the contrary, 
imagination is everything. The biblical texts constantly invite us 
to imagine God, to form mental images of God in order to love 
him, to fear him, to obey him. The visible images must disappear 
in order to make room for the word and the mental images it 
evokes. “ Where image is shall Torah be”—where Torah is to be, 
images must disappear. However, the path to negative theology 
is paved by the second commandment. As its ultimate conse- 
quence it leads to rejecting not only material but even mental 
imagesof God.
Between the two meanings of the prohibition of images, the 
political and the theological, lies a shift in religious orientation 
that may be described as a shift from monolatry to monotheism. 
Monolatry means the exclusive worship of only one god in a 
world supposed to be full of other gods. Monotheism, on the 
other hand, recognizes only one God and negates the existence 
of other gods. In the context of monolatry, images are forbidden 
because they constitute other gods and their cult amounts to 
apostasy. In the context of monotheism, they are forbidden
21
because their visibility precludes any contact with the true 
invisible God. The theological explanation that is given in 
Deuteronomy 4 belongs to a later stratum of the text when Israel 
has already made the move from monolatry to monotheism.
Let us now have a look at what may be counted as the “primal 
scene” of idolatry, the forbidden worship of images, the story of 
the Golden Calf as told in Exodus chapter 32. Moses climbed on 
top of Mount Sinai and stayed there for forty days. The people, 
despairing of Moses's return, asked Aaron to replace the absent 
representative of God by a representation: “Up, make us gods 
who shall go before us. As for this Moses, the man who brought 
us up out of the land of Egypt, we do not know what has become 
of him.” Aaron acquiesced to their demand and fashioned the 
Golden Calf. “And they said, ‘These are your gods, O Israel, who 
brought you upout of the land of Egyptl'” (Exodus 32:1-4)
Meanwhile, Moses, on Mount Sinai, is warned by God that the 
people are committing great crimes. God wants to destroy the 
people and to found with Moses another one, but Moses prevails 
on God to forgive and to give his people a second chance. 
However, when Moses returned and sawthe people dancing, 
he fell into a rage:.. he threw the tablets out of his hands and 
broke them at the foot of the mountain. He took the calf that they 
had made and burned it with fire and ground it to powder and 
scattered it on the water and made the people of Israel drink it."
What could be the meaning of grounding and diluting the Golden 
Calf and of making the people swallow it? Eating the sacred 
animals is—in the Egyptian imaginary—the worst religious crime 
possible. Drinking the diluted calf seems the equivalent of eating 
sacred animals. Again, we meet with the strange power that is 
attributed to images. Images are treated as sacred animals in 
the Egyptian sense, not as representations, but as incarnations
22
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of the divine, not as copy of a divine body but as divine bodies 
themselves.
But this is not enough. Moses also orders a massacre:
... then Moses stood in the gate of the camp and said, ‘Who 
ison the LORD'sside? Come to me' And all thesonsof Levi 
gathered around him. And he said to them, ‘Thus says the 
LORD God of Israel, “Put your sword on your side each of 
you, and go to and fro from gate to gate throughout the camp, 
and each of you kill his brother and his companion and his 
neighbor.'” And the sons of Levi did according to the word of 
Moses. And that day about three thousand men of the people 
fell. (Exodus 32)
The execution of this punishment is presented as a model of “zeal”: 
human zeal and divine jealousy are in Hebrew expressed by the 
same word qin’ah. El qanna’ means the jealous God, qana’im is 
the denomination of the zealots. Moses and the Levites act as 
qana'im in making themselves tools of God’s jealousy. This is 
what zealot means. The Arabic word for “zeal” is hamas. The story 
teaches that God’s distinction between friend and foe prevails 
over human bonds of kinship and friendship.
The sin of the Golden Calf is not a matter of disloyalty but of false 
theology. They did not want to leave Jahwe alone and to turn to 
other gods, but to replace the vanished representative with a 
representation of god to lead them to Canaan. They wanted the 
calf as an image of God. This was their mistake. The Golden Calf 
was not meant to be another god but it turned out to be a false 
way to God, a false god, dead matter. The God of Israel is not 
only invisible, he is also trans-mundane. The world of monotheism 
is disenchanted and de-divinized. In a disenchanted world, 
images are unable to establish any contact with the divine and 
turn into mere matter, gold, silver, stone, wood (see, for example, 
Psalm 115).
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We meet here with the concept of paganism, which monotheism 
constructs as its own counter-image. Unlike monolatry, mono- 
theism draws the distinction between true and false religion and 
condemns all other religions as false, i.e. pagan. The concept of 
the jealous God and, thus, the original meaning of the second 
commandment belongs to the stage of monolatry and does 
not reject the foreign gods as “false” and the other religions as 
paganism. They are simply forbidden for Israel. Monotheism, 
on the other hand, develops a universalist perspective where 
there is only one true God and where other religions that do not 
recognize the true God walk in the darkness of paganism. The 
hallmark of false religion or paganism is idolatry, the worship of 
images. Other and much longer examples of such invectives 
against foreign religions are Jeremiah chapter 10, Deutero-lsaiah 
chapter 44, and Song of Solomon chapters 12-15. These texts 
give a new answer to our question: What's wrong with images? 
Images are just helpless matter, pieces of wood or stone without 
the power to help themselves let alone others.
The ancient Egyptians and Babylonians held, of course, totally 
different views about the nature and power of images. They 
distinguished carefully between a statue and a god. An image 
becomes a medium for establishing a contact with the divine only 
after complex rites of consecration and investiture, only tempo- 
rarily, and only within the special, temporal, and social frames of 
the cult. All this was, of course, well known to Jeremiah, Deutero- 
Isaiah, and other biblical writers, but they abstracted from this 
knowledge for the sake of satire. The most explicit theory of the 
cult-image appears only in a much later Egyptian text, which is 
written in the third century A.D. in view of rising Christianity: the 
hermetic treatise of Asclepius. This text devotes several chapters 
to the statues “animated and conscious, filled with spirit and 
doing great deeds, statues that foreknow the future and predict 
it by lots, by prophecy, by dreams and by many other means;
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statues, that make people ill and cure them, bringing them pain 
and pleasure as each deserves.”1 Images are not dead matter 
but are vessels of divine presence. They provide an interface 
between the divine and the human worlds, between heaven and 
earth. “Do you not know,” the text continues, “that Egypt is an 
image of heaven or, to be more precise, that everything governed 
and moved in heaven came down to Egypt and was transferred 
there? If truth be told, our land is the temple of the whole world.” 
Images are the means of bringing the divine down and making it 
dwell in Egypt. Images, in the eyes of those who believe in them 
(let us call them “iconists”), achieve precisely the same as they 
prevent in the eyes of the “iconoclasts”: making god dwell among 
the people and ensuring sacred communication. Images and 
sacred animals are media of divine immanence. Iconoclasm would 
deprive the world of this divine animation and would turn it into 
mere inanimate matter, doomed to pollution and decomposition. 
The hermetic treatise continues by giving a vivid description of 
what it calls “the old age of the world” (senectus mundi). 
(Asclepius chapters 24-26)2
The worship of images is a worship of the cosmos or, to use a 
word coined in the eighteenth century, “cosmotheism.” Images 
are not mimetic reduplications of visible reality but vessels of 
the invisible, intra-mundane powers that animate the world from 
within. In the view of the aniconists, images idolize the world and 
blind the eyes for looking beyond the world and focusing on the
1 Asclepius chapter 24 in Hermetica: The 
Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin 
Asclepius, translated and edited by Brian 
Copenhaver (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 81.
2 Asclepius chapters 24-26, eds. A.D. 
Nock & A.J. Festugi6re (Paris: Collection 
Bud6 1960), pp. 326-329 (with omissions); 
coptic version: Nag Hammadi Codex VI,
8 65.15-78.43, eds. Martin Krause and Pahor 
Labib, 1971, pp. 194-200. See also: Carsten
Colpe and Jens Holzhausen, Das Corpus 
Hermeticum Deutsch (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1997), vol. 1.1, 
287f.; Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
pp. 39-43; Jean-Pierre Mah6, Herm&s en 
Haute-lzgypte, vol. 2 (Qu6bec: Les Presses 
De L'Universit6 Laval, 1982), pp. 69-97; and 
David Frankfurter, Elijah in Upper Egypt 
(London: Trinity Press International, 1993), 
p. 188f.
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creator. Instead of establishing a contact, images block the 
communication with God whose presence can only be felt like, 
to quote Stefan George, “airfrom other planets blowing.” For 
the iconists, the divine is not like airfrom other planets blowing 
but the very air that is blowing in this world and that makes it an 
abode habitable for both men and gods. To the aniconists, this 
happiness with and within the world as it is appears like blind 
entanglement. Idolatry means Weltverstrickung, entanglement 
within the world, addiction to the visible and the material.
In the last part of this paper, I propose to have a look at what 
became of the prohibition of images in occidental Christianity. 
Christianity readmitted the images, images of the visible and even 
images of the invisible. With its incarnation in Jesus Christ, the 
word became visible and left even an imprint on the handkerchief 
of Veronica whose name means “true image" (vera icon). In the 
history of monotheism, Christianity meant a huge iconic turn. 
However, the Ten Commandments remained valid and among 
them the prohibition of images and the incrimination of idolatry. 
The writings of the church fathers are full of violent invectives 
against the idolaters. Idolatry is treated as madness, an illness, 
a kind of addiction, and a satanic performance. The traces of 
Christian iconoclasm are to be seen everywhere in Egypt. 
Occidental Christian history is thus informed by a deep conflict 
between iconism and iconoclasm, between a culture of the word 
and a culture of the image. After the first iconic turn in late antiquity 
there was a draw back in the form of Byzantine iconoclasm, which 
lasted for a century until the conflict was finally solved in favor of 
images.
A similar wave of iconoclasm occurred with the Reformation. 
Sculptures, paintings, and even organs were removed from 
Protestant churches and in large part destroyed. On the other 
hand, the Reformation led to an enormous boom of word culture,
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of writing, printing, and reading, of teaching and preaching, of 
philology and hermeneutics. With the counter-reformation in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, the pendulum 
swung in the opposite direction and we see another iconic turn 
triumphantly setting in especially in the Catholic countries of 
the South. The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the 
beginnings of bourgeois culture, however, show many traits again 
of an anti-iconic word culture. Until this day, the intellectual history 
of the West is torn between iconism and iconoclasm, a culture 
of the image and a culture of the word.
Heinrich Heine gave vivid expression to this double-facedness of 
European modernity. I’ll again give first the quote in German and 
try an English translation:
Menschen sind entweder Juden oder Hellenen, Menschen 
mit asketischen, bildfeindlichen, vergeistigungssuchtigen 
Trieben oder Menschen von heiterem, entfaltungsstolzem 
und realistischem Wesen.-
[All people are either Jews or Hellenes, people with ascetic 
and iconoclastic instincts who are addicted to intellectualizing, 
or people of a sunny and realistic temperament who take pride 
in their own organic growth.]
Note the irony: Jewish asceticism is presented as a matter of 
“instinct” and “addiction," Greek pride and serenity a matter of 
“temperament.”
Sigmund Freud held similar ideas about Judaism and its prone- 
ness to spiritualization. In his last book, Moses and Monotheism, 
he outlines his ideas about monotheism as an advance in spiritual- 
ity or intellectuality, i.e. in “word culture,” and sees in the Jewish 
people the paragon of this movement. The Jews owed this 
advantage in intellectuality to the prohibition of images, which
3 Heinrich Heine, Werke, vol. 4 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Insel, 1994), p. 350.
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forced them to turn away from the sensual and to concentrate 
on the intellectual:
Among the precepts of the Moses religion there is one that is 
of greater importance than appears to begin with. This is the 
prohibition against making an image of god—the compulsion 
to worship a god whom one cannot see. In this, I suspect, 
Moses was outdoing the strictness of the Aten religion. 
Perhaps he merely wanted to be consistent: his god would in 
that case have neither a name nor a countenance. Perhaps it 
wasafresh measure against magical abuses. But ifthis 
prohibition were accepted, it must have a profound effect.
For it meant that a sensory perception was given second 
place to what may be called an abstract idea—a triumph of 
intellectuality over sensuality or, strictly speaking, an instinc- 
tual renunciation, with all its necessary psychological 
consequences.-
In his Kritikder Urteilakraft [Critique of Judgement], Immanuel 
Kant interpreted the prohibition of images 150 years earlier 
already in a similar way:
There is perhaps no passage more sublime in the Jewish Law 
Code than the commandment, ‘You shall not make for thyself 
any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven 
above or that is in the earth beneath etc.’ This commandment 
alone is sufficient to explain the enthusiasm which the Jewish 
people in its more civilized epochs felt for its religion or even 
that pride which is inspired by Mohamedanism.
In the last decade of the eighteenth century, when Kant wrote 
his third critique, the “sublime” ranked as the central category of 
aesthetics. The sublime is the opposite of the beautiful. Whereas 
the beautiful appeals to the senses and attracts humans to the
4 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism 
(New York: Knopf, 1939), pp. 359-360.
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visible and the sensual world, the sublime transcends our sensual 
and conceptual capabilities of comprehension; it repels the 
senses and tears humans away from their everyday entangle- 
ments, exposing them to the horrors of the unknown and leading 
to a transformation and “sublimation" of their nature, which 
reminds us of Freud’s concept of sublimation. This leads to a 
totally different conception of the power or impotence of images. 
What’s wrong with images? They lure the mind into sensual 
attractions and lead to cultural regression.
In his later days, Goethe seems to have fostered similar opinions 
about images and image-culture. In one of his Zahme Xenien he 
wrote:
Dummes Zeug kann man viel reden, 
kann es auch schreiben.
Wird weder Leib noch Seele tbten, 
es wird alles beim Alten bleiben.
Dummes aber, vors Auge gestellt, 
hat ein magisches Recht.
Weil es die Sinne gefesselt halt, 
bleibt der Geist ein Knecht,s
[Silly stuff may be said enough, 
and may also be written - 
this will kill neither body nor soul, 
nothing will be changed.
Silly stuff, however, put before the eyes, 
raises a magic claim.
Since it keeps the senses enthralled, 
the mind is made a slave.] 5
5 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Samtliche 
Werke in 18.Banden,vol. 1 (Ziirich/ Munich:
Artemis, 1977), p. 617.
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This sounds as if Goethe were writing in and against the age of 
television and advertisement. What’s wrong with images? Their 
magic claim. What Goethe calls their “magic claim” is the kind 
of constraint they are exerting on our imagination as long as 
they operate outside language and verbal reflection. A verbal 
statement may be answered by way of rejection, elaboration, 
modification, or making a counterstatement. But how to answer 
images? This is precisely what we have to learn in order to escape 
their magic claim and their power to enslave the mind. The solution 
seems to be not the prohibition of images but the acquisition of 
iconic literacy. Novelist Paul Auster once wrote, “The world 
enters us through our eyes, but we cannot make sense of it until 
it descends into our mouths.”6 Images and sounds surround 
and invade us in the form of a largely unconscious sphere. Only 
by the constant labor of linguistic articulation and formulation 
are we able to transform at least parts of this sonic and iconic 
environment into the sphere of consciousness. Only under this 
condition are even sounds and icons able to function as carriers 
of meaning and means of world-articulation.
This text is an adapted contribution from a session on lconoclasm, which 
took place within the discourse program On Post-Secularism, part of 
The Return of Religion and Other Myths project.
6 Paul Auster, Moon Palace (New York:
Viking, 1989). I owe this quote to Aleida 
Assmann.
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